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Abstract
Can human rights in education be read as not empty words but as a critical framework in order to enhance 
students and teachers capacity to reimagine their local community and to rethink the rules and laws that 
support such a social community? Th is paper examines constraints with human rights in cosmopolitan edu-
cation, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis and Adriana Cavarero. By placing 
learning at the center of political community, as Castoriadis through the notion of paideia, the aims of such an 
education become a focal point in discussing the tensions between local and global ethical concerns. Accord-
ing to Castoriadis, society exists only insofar as it is embodied in its social individuals. Society and its individu-
als are in a constant process toward relational autonomy that implies a moral self-limitation. At the core of 
this inquiry into moral subjectifi cation is the need to re-think human rights and the pedagogical subject in 
relational terms that imply self-limitation and political engagement in social community.
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Human rights, education, justice, Cornelius Castoriadis
Introduction
Th e tensions between global and local concerns are actualized in justice education. A pre-
mise in this paper is that political subjectifi cation is both moral and relational.1 How lear-
ners are to develop a sense of responsibility in a world of diff erence has been explored both 
from a nationalistic terminology in patriotic education1 and citizenship education2 as well 
1 Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” In For Love of Country, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1996). Martha Nussbaum, “Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism,” Deadalus 137 (2008), doi: 10.1162/
daed.2008.137.3.78. Marianna Papastephanou, “Cosmopolitanism Discarded: Martha Nussbaum’s Patriotic Edu-
cation and the Inward-Outward Distinction,” Ethics and Education 8 (2013). Claudia Schumann, “Which Love of 
Country? Tensions, Questions, and Contexts for Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism in Education,” presented at the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain PESGB, New College, Oxford, March 26, 2015.
2 Cf. James A. Banks, “Citizenship Education and Diversity Implications for Teacher Education,” Journal of Teacher 
Education 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 5-16; Fred M. Newmann, “Citizenship Education in the United States: A State-
ment of Needs,” May 1987.
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as from a universalistic terminology in cosmopolitan education3 and human rights educa-
tion.4 Th e division between patriotic5 and cosmopolitan6 explorations on justice education 
sheds light on a presumed dichotomy between national/global belonging and rights. I have 
elsewhere7 argued that we need to move beyond this dichotomy as politics is not confi ned 
to spaces determined by a local/global terminology and human rights as universal princip-
les can be voiced through local concerns.
Th ere is a theoretical vantage point of developing the term of critical cosmopolitanism 
as it is situated between the ‘tensions within modernity’,8 between universalism and glo-
balization on the one hand, and particularism and plurality on the other hand.9 A critical 
cosmopolitanism is meant to ‘pick out those processes which might not equally well be 
discussed under the heading of globalization’.10 But there is still the need to explore how 
interactions between universalistic, idealizing aspirations and particularist commitments 
can be understood in education.
Questions dealing with social justice in education today have given way to time-con-
suming measurement of eff ectiveness stirred in contemporary educational discourses on 
neoliberalism. Th e notion of the learning subject as an autonomous individual, responsi-
ble for her/his own learning is being continuously articulated through educational policies 
such as the No Child Left Behind Act. Th is policy focuses on improving ‘individual outcome’ 
in education through standard testing and suggests that learning is a sovereign endeavor. 
Responsibility is thus seen as individual, not relational. Frank Margonis11 raises a post-colonial 
critique against such individualistic views of responsibility in education, arguing that when 
students are expelled from school, as a punishment for not taking responsibility for ‘their 
learning’, something more fundamental is at stake than merely proving a moral point.12 Th e 
relational dynamics of responsibility, of acting ethical in pedagogical relations, looses its 
3 Cf. David T. Hansen, Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching (New York & London: Teachers College Press, 2001); 
Casey E. George-Jackson, “Th e Cosmopolitan University: Th e Medium toward Global Citizenship and Justice.” 
Policy Futures in Education 8, no. 2 (2010).
4 George J. Andreopoulos and Richard Pierre Claude, Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century, (Phila-
delphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Cornelia, Roux, Safe Spaces Human Rights Education in Diverse 
Contexts, (Rotterdam; Boston: Sense, 2012). 
5 Nussbaum, “Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism.”
6 Marianna Papastephanou, “Cosmopolitanism Discarded: Martha Nussbaum’s Patriotic Education and the Inward-
Outward Distinction,” Ethics and Education 8, no. 2 (2013).
7 Rebecca Adami, “Human Rights For More Th an One Voice: Re-Th inking Political Space Beyond the Local/Global 
Divide,” Ethics & Global Politics 7, no. 4 (2014): 163-80.
8 G. Delanty “Th e Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Th eory,” Th e British Journal of 
Sociology 57, no. 1 (2006): 8.
9 Claudia Schumann and Rebecca Adami, “Towards a Critical Cosmopolitanism in Human Rights Learning: Th e 
Vienna Conference in 1993,” In ed. Marianna Papastephanou, Torill Strand and Anne Pirrie, Philosophy as Lived 
Experience. Navigating through Dichotomies of Th ought and Action, (Berlin: VDM Verlag, 2014).
10 Ibid., 274.
11 Frank Margonis in a talk at Teachers College, Program for Philosophy of Education Colloquium, Sep 2014, ‘Holding 
Students Responsible (and the Resulting Relational Pathologies)’, at Columbia University, New York.
12 ibid.
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validity when learners are left outside the notion of belonging. As Gert Biesta13 notes, lear-
ning should be seen primarily as a relational activity in a given social environment, through 
communication with others. What a notion of the learning subject as relational, drawing 
on John Dewey’s notion of learning as communication implies, is an understanding that 
learning does not take place in a social vacuum, rather the ethics in pedagogical relations 
and the commitment to the social community play primary roles in learning with others. 
David Hansen14 amongst others has stressed the importance of understanding how tea-
chers and students create relations that exceed the classroom, encompassing their social 
and political community in which education is not seen as isolated from one’s lived reality 
but becomes a way of life.
Drawing on this earlier research I articulate a notion of a relational learning on human 
rights and I will focus in the following more on the political dimensions. Th e problem with 
human rights learning is that there is a general lack of looking at its connection to the local 
politics and social community in which it is discussed. Human rights are generally discus-
sed in relation to others, who are in need of rights, as a kind of charity, but this learning, I 
will argue, needs to take place with those who have no rights, and/or as enhancing pedago-
gical relations through critical and creative communication on the legislative and political 
community in which learners are situated.
Th e Pedagogical Subject as Relational
Education and learning is at the center of the notion of human rights. Th ere were two 
aims with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the explicit aim was for 
everyone to learn their human rights in relation to its implicit aim, for everyone to claim 
human rights legally within a political community. Th e knowledge about human rights 
when acted upon can thus turn the articles of a declaration into actual legal and political 
entitlements but this requires adequate legal and political institutions in society – available 
to all. Th e realization of human rights is hindered by a lack of such institutions and hindered 
as well by people violating each others rights. Human rights is hence a web of confl icting 
claims and can be fully realized only (and this is an utopia) when individuals respect others 
rights as their own. If learning about human rights is an acknowledgement of its relational 
dimensions, as acted knowledge, then we can visualize this learning process as one that is in 
constant relation to others. Th ere are diff erent degrees of dependence in how we read the 
notion relationality. Th inkers who draw on Emmanuel Levinas tend to understand human 
dependence as almost being determined by others; that others actions are infl icted upon 
13 Gert Biesta, “Of All Aff airs, Communication Is the Most Wonderful’: Th e Communicative Turn in Dewey’s Demo-
cracy and Education,” In ed. David T. Hansen, John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect, 23-38, (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2006).
14 Hansen, Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching.
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oneself. Sharon Todd15 for one has conceptualized learning from the other as this relational 
dependency, where the subject is called by the other’s presence to listen. 
I want to diff erentiate here between being relationally dependent and relationally deter-
mined by others, where I lean against the former notion in this paper. For example, one is 
dependent on others to communicate, but others do not determine how one chooses to 
respond to diff erence and agonistic standpoints. One is dependent on others for the rea-
lization of human rights; there is a dependency between the individual in relation to her/
his community in which political, social, economic and cultural rights can fl ourish. Human 
rights are per defi nition a notion that concerns and sets limits for human relations, and 
relations between the individual and her/his society. However, one is not determined by 
the rules and laws given in a society or by the discriminatory practices between human 
beings, for an individual can initiate a thought, an imagination, an act, which is dissonant 
in a community, and this staging of dissensus can create a web of unforeseen relations and 
politics. As with the civil rights movement, overruling and questioning the ‘status quo’ was 
initiated through speech and acts that went against the human-created-laws that individu-
als were supposed to be ‘determined by’. 
Both Hannah Arendt16 and Adriana Cavarero17 argue that it is in relation to others that 
politics is created, we get a glimpse of ourselves through our actions and words, which 
are relational, hence we are dependent on others for acknowledging our uniqueness, as 
distinct in relation to others. According to Cavarero,18 the self is totally external and relatio-
nal. I follow Cavarero19 to the point of understanding uniqueness as distinct in relation to 
others, although her radical view of the self as totally external I see only if reading Cavarero 
as expressing here what is exposed to the self and others through narration (as narration is 
external).20 Hence, what we can know of our self is external, but this does not take away the 
possibility that there is more, unseen, unspoken, inside. Arendt21 and Cavarero22 are intere-
sted in the external, in the relational dynamics of narration, since it bears the potential of 
having political signifi cance.
Th e concept of ‘uniqueness’ according to Arendt, is ontologically coupled with plurality. 
Human beings make up a plurality in the world and through our words and deeds (which 
are relationally shared and given their political meaning) we expose our uniqueness in rela-
tion to others. We voice, not our particularity, but our uniqueness in relation to others, 
15 Sharon Todd, Learning from the Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2003).
16 Hannah Arendt,  Men in Dark Times, (New York: Paperback,1968); Hannah Arendt Th e Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1958).
17 Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, (New York: Routledge, 2000).
18 Cavarero, Relating Narratives.
19 Cavarero, Relating Narratives.
20 See further Rebecca Adami, Human Rights Learning: Th e Signifi cance of Narratives, Relationality and Uniqueness. 
(Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2014).
21 Arendt, Men in Dark Times.
22 Cavarero, Relating Narratives.
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in the plurality that human beings create in inhabiting the world. By this, the notion of 
uniqueness in relation to learning does not mean that learning is a solitary process that 
only involves the ‘learning subject’ who is sovereign as a rational individual. Rather, unique-
ness indicates here that we learn about ourselves, and others only in concrete relations, 
between ‘you’ and ‘me’, seen as a process of becoming. 
Drawing on this notion of relationality, that Arendt and Cavarero sees as an ontological 
condition for uniqueness and for acting and speaking in the world, we can conceptualize 
learning as a constant process of becoming, in relation to others. Th is shifts the focus, as 
Biesta23 also argues in his reading of education as communication, to relations in education 
(the hidden curriculum) that concern the ethics and moral dimension of human interac-
tions, both between individuals, and between the individual and her/his political commu-
nity. 
In order to explore this relational dimension as in relation to the political community 
and the transformative potential that education has when seen as central to political par-
ticipation in community, I turn to Cornelius Castoriadis24 and his notion of paideia. Fol-
lowing Castoriadis we fi nd a conceptualization of the pedagogical subject as a relational 
project, who is in a constant movement towards freeing her/his capacity of doing and 
acting in the world together with others.25 Castoriadis talks about pedagogy or paideia, 
which is aimed at subjectivity. Castoriadis argues that the most human quality is our abi-
lity for radical imagination, an imagination that has the ability to create something new. 
Th e pedagogical subject, drawing on Castioriadis, is a project; a process aimed at a certain 
autonomy, which for Castoriadis is always both individual and collective, as a coming into 
self-refl exivity. Castoriadis use the term ‘social individual’ to denote individual as reading 
‘sovereign and autonomous’ but rather as in social community. Autonomy is hence created 
in relations with others, on a level of social community and according to Castoriadis this 
autonomy implies self-limitation.
Re-claiming Politics as Relational Subjectifi cation 
Th e notion of politics that I am sketching out here in relation to human rights is broader 
than the general view of the political, concerning party politics, national politics and admi-
nistrative governmental institutions in representative political systems. Both Arendt and 
Castoriadis are very inspired by the Greek polis in their understandings of politics. What 
makes up this public space and how do peoples actions and deeds receive their political 
signifi cance in such a space? Both Arendt26 and Castoriadis27 center human relations at the 
23 Biesta, “Th e Communicative Turn in Dewey’s Democracy and Education.”
24 Cornelius Castoriadis and David Ames Curtis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Imagination. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
25 Castoriadis and Curtis, World in Fragments.
26 Hannah Arendt, Th e Promise of Politics, (New York: Schocken Books, 2005).
27 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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core of politics. Arendt sees politics as occurring when others receive words and actions 
that create a web of relations through reactions. Castoriadis, on the other hand, stresses 
the capacity of the human imagination in creating and recreating the society and the laws 
in our social communities. For Arendt,28 the human being becomes distinct in relation to 
others when she speaks and acts in the world, it is only through our deeds that we get a 
glimpse of who we are on a public arena. For Castoriadis, politics is a process of subjectifi -
cation, where he does not want to draw a distinct line between the social individual and 
society, since these constitute each other. In a sense, Arendt is as radical on this point, sta-
ting that the premise for politics is the ontological condition of plurality in the world.29 We 
speak and act in a world with others, who are diff erent. 
Th e notion of politics that Arendt and Castoriadis off er in my reading is a radical reclai-
ming of the relational condition of politics, where human relations, words and deeds on 
a public arena are crucial, and where the political institutions of representative ‘democr-
acy’ has little to do with politics in its ‘true’ sense. Politics, in this radical view, concerns 
everyone, and demands of everyone to care about our common world and to critically 
question the legal and political institutions of society, in order to create and recreate our 
political reality. Living in community with others is a condition for the possibility of acting 
political. Without a proper polis, a social community in which everyone has a moral obliga-
tion to speak their mind, there is no politics. 
Instead of talking about a ‘political subject’ or defi ning politics as a certain set of ‘acts’ 
and ‘formal processes’, Arendt,30 Castoridais31 and Cavarero32 base politics on the condition 
of plurality and relationality. Hence, we cannot talk of a political subject who is a ‘sovere-
ign’ individual who is ‘political’ or of a national system that is ‘democratic’, but we need 
to acknowledge the social individual as dependent on others to create politics, and to 
acknowledge our deeds and actions as reciprocal, created in relations and dependent on 
the responses they provoke in others. Castoriadis criticizes the understanding that there 
can be ‘experts’ in democracy or that ‘representative democracy’ is actually democratic. 
Following this line of thought, politics is nothing one can leave to the hand of ‘politicians’, 
but politics is created in the hands of people, acting together for change. 
If human beings are dependent on others in this notion of politics and if there cannot 
be a clear line between individuals and society, then the polis, the political community in 
which peoples deeds and actions are counted as political, becomes crucial for understan-
ding the radicality of politics.
28 Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, the Life of a Jewess, (Baltimore and London: Th e John Hopkins University Press, 
1997); Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy: With a New Preface, Cornell Paperbacks. 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
29 Arendt, Th e Human Condition.
30 Ibid.
31 Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy.
32 Cavarero, Relating Narratives.
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Th e notion of a polis is simultaneously a questioning of the political borders and even 
legal spaces that we are used to. Th e nation state as the natural space in which politics 
takes place and in which human beings are seen as equal before the law as citizens hence 
no longer becomes the natural way of conceptualizing political territory and space33. Th e 
political community, the polis, is not the same as a state. Both Arendt34 and Castoriadis35 
spend time in their respective works on diff erentiating their notion of the polis and a notion 
of the state. At the center of this political space is communication, of acting and speaking 
in relation to others. Th e ethos of such a community, as Castoriadis argues, is developed 
through an ongoing process of moral subjectifi cation through the notion of paideia.
Paideia at the Core of Political Community
Castoriadis places not rationality but creative imagination as the ‘core component of 
nontrivial thinking’.36 His view of the social individuals’ capacity for imagining and reima-
gining society and its laws is central for how he perceives paideia as at the core of political 
community. Th e aim of political community is to reach autonomy, but this autonomy is 
relational and it implies self-limitation. Castoriadis draws up a notion of freedom as auto-
nomy, but he is more interested in how this freedom is used by the individuals in society, 
than freedom per se. 
Th e existence of a public space is not just a matter of legal provisions guaranteeing rights of 
free speech, etc. such provisions are but conditions for a public space to exist. Th e important 
question is: What are the people actually doing with these rights?37
Rights and freedoms, according to Castoriadis, are conditions for a public space, and he is 
intrigued by the question of what comes next, how do people use these rights and free-
doms? Th e active participation of social individuals in community becomes central for his 
inquiry, where he argues that the degree of freedom, or autonomy, in a society (the actual 
existence of rights and freedoms) is always in relation to the degree individuals’ use these 
provisions in a way that does not limit the rights and freedoms of others. Hence Castoria-
dis’ notion of a kind of moral self-limitation as coupled with autonomy. Again, we need to 
be aware that Castoriadis is not using ‘autonomy’ here in a traditional understanding of 
‘rational beings who are individually sovereign’, rather, he defi nes autonomy in relational 
terms. Autonomy according to Castoriadis is to be dependent on others, in a polis, of using 
33 Adami, Human Rights Learning 
34 Hannah Arendt, Th e Promise of Politics.
35 Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy.
36 Ibid., 85.
37 Ibid., 113.
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one’s capacity for imagination in recreating the society that constitutes its social individu-
als. In order for people to be able to reimagine their political community and the laws that 
abide in a society, people need to critically examine and question the laws and rules of their 
social world, and be utopian enough to think beyond the current existing ideas of rights 
and freedoms. 
What Castoriadis off ers us here, is a notion of education as the center of political 
community, of creating the possibility for people to use their rights and freedoms, to 
rethink the current laws in place and to reimagine society. According to Castoriadis ‘only 
the education (paideia) of the citizens as citizens can give valuable, substantive content to 
the ‘public space’’.38 Paideia is education ‘from birth to death’39 and Castoriadis views pai-
deia as a central dimension of any politics of autonomy. 
Becoming conscious that each and every individual constitutes the society in which 
she/he lives implies great moral obligation towards our fellow human beings. Th e notion of 
human rights, receives its meaning through reciprocal communication, through the words 
and actions that constitute the political dimension of having a public space together with 
others who are diff erent and at the same time unique. As Castoriadis argues, each indi-
vidual in a polis has the freedom of speech and is under a moral obligation to speak her/
his mind on matters of political concern. Th is moral dimension of politics is simultane-
ously creating a revolutionary potential in how people can use their imagination in order 
to speak, act and create new ways of living together. Th e act of philosophizing in this sense 
does not become a lonely business of inwardness, but a social moral obligation to think 
beyond the current frames of rules and boundaries for togetherness in the polis. According 
to Castoriadis ‘the Athenian citizen is not a ‘private philosopher’, or a ‘private artist’, he is a 
citizen for whom philosophy and art have become ways of life’.40
Re-Imagining and Re-Creating Laws and the Polis
In order to keep paideia open for imagination and the recreation of laws and rights, we, 
as educators, need to be cautious of confl ating citizen rights with the notion of human 
rights, since the former belongs to notions of political space as limited to the state, and the 
latter is an utopian imaginary of political and legal inclusion of everyone through notions 
of human dignity rather than national citizenship and legal status based on the human 
creation of national borders and territories. 
Arendt41 argues that in education, ‘there is always a temptation to believe that we are 




41 Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Th ought, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
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importance only to those immediately aff ected’,42 when in fact, Arendt continues, pro-
blems that arises in one part of the world are equally possible in other places. I read this 
argument as a cosmopolitan awareness in education to deal with problems and human 
challenges, not as confi ned within national borders, but as equally acute everywhere since 
human crisis’s eff ect us all in diff erent ways. In order to create a better preparation for 
crises we need to be aware and learn from the way challenges occur in diff erent historical, 
political and legal contexts. 
Brian Orend43 criticizes a Western conception of human rights education as limited to a 
nationalistic perspective on rights. As educationalists, do we want to ‘teach’ students rights 
as referred to in the constitution as the application of laws drafted by laymen, politicians 
and legal experts – as fait accompli? In philosophy of law the legal justifi cations based on 
concepts of justice and morals in relation to the application of laws are under constant 
scrutiny. Roscoe Pound44 for one questions the moral perfection of laws and distinguishes 
between the aim of justice and the limitations of jurisdiction. As legal systems are created 
in societies that uphold discriminatory practices; a justice oriented learning on rights may 
include a process of re-imagining rights into broader, more utopian ways. Arendt45 criticizes 
in Th e Origins of Totalitarianism the notion of human rights as non-existent for stateless 
people after the World War Two as the political power of rights were (and still continues 
to be) useless for non-citizens. Arendt46 argues that human beings ‘are not born equal; we 
become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee our-
selves mutually equal rights’.47 Notions of rights that exceed national borders may include 
people who are excluded today, due to territorial borders, which challenges our understan-
ding of what we today defi ne as a political community and who we see as included legally 
in such a polis? Arendt48 distinguishes between law, politics and the drawing up of national 
borders in her discussion on the Greeks and Romans and how they perceived law-making49 
as laying down the rules for citizens within a polis, or as creating ties with people. Th e 
former is descriptive of national jurisdiction whereas the former description can be linked 
to the international legal system today.50
Within a human rights discourse, there is a possibility to critically question the laws that 
abide in a given society, and also to question the current legal defi nitions of who is regarded 
as equal before the law, and who is included to participate in the polis. 
42 Ibid., 171.
43 Brian Orend, “Human Rights Education: Form, Content and Controversy,” Encounters on Education 5 (2008): 61-80.
44 Roscoe Pound, Social Control Th rough Law, (New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
45 Hannah Arendt, Th e Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt Inc, 1973).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 301.
48 Hannah Arendt, Th e Promise of Politics.
49 Ibid., 179-187.
50 Th ere is a crucial diff erence between the tie binding nature of Roman laws and the international law system of 
human rights, that may not need further explanation, as the Romans as an empire dominated their contracting 
parnters in colonial ways by force and oppression. See further Adami, Human Rights Learning. 
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Th e inclusion and exclusion of individuals in these respective notions of rights today can 
be traced to the inclusion and exclusion of plurality in the creation of human rights versus 
citizens’ rights in declarative texts historically. Th ere is a great diff erence in the process of 
how rights were drafted in 1789 as part of the process of uniting the states of America in an 
attempt to avoid future civil war under a common constitution that would guarantee the 
rights of its citizens and the drafting of human rights in 1948 after the Second World War 
as a way to create limitations for the sovereignty of states and avoid a second Holocaust. 
Th e drafting of the American Constitution was behind closed doors. No media or out-
side people were being let in to observe the process and all the notes taken by James Madi-
son (1751-1836) from the drafting was sent later directly to the government. Th ese notes 
became public years later. Th ere were 55 delegates taking part in the process, all white, all 
men and almost all, except for Benjamin Franklin who was then 81, were in the age bet-
ween 30-40. Slavery was a controversial topic during the discussions and it was decided 
that it was up to the individual states to decide about slavery. ‘For the purposes of taxation 
and determining how many representatives a state could send to Congress, it was decided 
that slaves would be counted as three-fi fths of a person.’51 In 1789, Madison wrote ten 
amendments to the constitution, these ten amendments are today known collectively as 
the Bill of Rights and include the right to bare arms and to own property.
If we only look at who was included in the drafting of the American Constitution we can 
agree that the Bill of Rights, the ten amendments to the constitution, by Madison, were the 
rights of the white, privileged, protestant Man who owned property, others where counted 
as third of a person, or not regarded at all as having rights. Still these declarative texts are 
being reinterpreted and read by thousands of people who reimagine the notions of rights 
initially drafted, which is part of a relational process of moral subjectifi cation in a polis that 
grows or changes demographically.
Th e Civil Rights Movement provides an example of how people who were initially exclu-
ded form the term of rights in the American Constitution have reclaimed civil rights to 
become more inclusive. Th e strategy of questioning segregating laws was a strategic ende-
avor where calculations of the cost to upgrade the conditions at schools for Afro American 
pupils was being presented to politicians – a cost they were not willing to pay. When the 
Afro American lawyer Constance Baker Motely wrote the initial complaint 1950 in the case 
of Brown versus Board of Education she had strategically criticized the segregating laws 
in Southern schools, busses and public spaces denied to blacks – a process that lead to a 
recreation of segregating laws that initially was argued based on a racist discourse as having 
support in the American Constitution, to become more just. Baker Motley succeeded in 
winning a case Meredith versus Fair to get the fi rst Afro American student enrolled at the 
University of Mississippi in 1962. 
51 http://www.history.com/topics/constitution#section_1
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Th e United Nations Human Rights Commission was created in 1946 in order to draft a 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (initially referred to as a declaration on the Rights 
of Man). Th e delegates to the commission were appointed on personal merit, as lawyers, 
diplomats, academics and human rights activists, and their aim was to create a notion of 
rights that exceeded a notion of citizen rights, so that people, as a last resort, could use 
revolutionary means to overrule any government that oppressed its inhabitants. With the 
Second World War, the demography in Europe had changed, leaving thousands of people 
without their former rights (either because they had been deprived their rights from tota-
litarian regimes, or because they had fl ed from their countries of origin and where now 
staying in a country as aliens lacking legal status). 
Th e notion of ‘human rights’ then became a social imaginary for the future, in a present 
when so many people found themselves deprived of a polis, becoming completely right-
sless. We fi nd this challenge still today, with Mexican citizens staying without legal status 
in the US, being deprived of their right to vote, without freedom of speech and press, since 
their very existence in the country denies them the legal safety to question and critically 
examine the limits of civil rights. Voicing another imaginary of such rights would challenge 
their silent existence in exile.
Rights – by whom and for whom?
Th e American Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are not isola-
ted texts without authors, they were not created in a political vacuum, rather, these decla-
rations were drafted in respective historical contexts. Th e drafters of declarations have ‘a 
face, a name and a life story’.52 Th ese texts carry a political weight when acted on in social 
communities, in human relations. It matters who is included and who is not when noti-
ons of rights and freedoms are claimed and reclaimed.53 Th e composition of individuals 
behind legal texts on rights and freedoms indicates the inclusive or exclusive character of 
the rights theirein based on the intent of the drafters. In the drafting of the UDHR, women 
and non-western individuals were present and had a voice during the process54 amounting 
pressure on the colonial powers. Th ese non-western delegates were both male and female 
Communists, Muslims and Catholics.55 Th e value confl icts that arose during the UN sessi-
ons created politics, agonistic politics, through which the inclusion of economic and social 
52 Adriana Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 193.
53 Rebecca Adami, “Intersectional Dialogue – A Cosmopolitical Dialogue of Ethics.” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal 5, no. 2 (August 14, 2013): 45-62. doi:10.5130/ccs.v5i2.3179.
54 Rebecca Adami, “Counter Narratives as Political Contestation: Universality, Particularity and Uniqueness,” Th e 
Equal Rights Review 15 (2015): 13-24.
55 Rebecca Adami, “Reconciling Universality and Particularity through a Cosmopolitan Outlook on Human Rights,” 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 2 (August 27, 2012): 22-37.
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rights due to pressure from communist and socialist countries, and the formulation of 
‘every human being’ rather than ‘Man’ was being used.56
Th e drafting of the UDHR included delegates from over sixty countries, representing 
diff erent and sometimes agonistic religious and non-religious belief systems.57 Th e over two 
hundred UN sessions where the declaration was being debated and discussed were open 
for media coverage and hundreds of NGOs were present to lobby (for example for the 
inclusion of womens’ human rights). Th e wording in the UDHR was being stripped down 
through the drafting process, taking away all direct or indirect cultural, religious and ethnic 
references to God and particular beliefs – so that the delegates, coming from agonistic 
belief systems, could agree on the same text.58 Th e text includes a long non-discrimination 
list, so as to make it inclusive for everyone, regardless of ethnicity, gender, economic and 
social status, but at the same time keeping it open for interpretation, to be able to claim 
and understand such rights on confl icting moral and political grounds.59
Jurisdiction is about applying laws, whereas what Castoriadis examines is the pedago-
gical subjects capacity for re-imagining laws and hence of changing what may seem as ‘fait 
accompli’. In order to make this process a possibility in education there is a need to off er 
teachers rights-dilemmas in larger social communities, valuable in making and creating 
ethical considerations that may lay the ground for a human rights-based judgment in dif-
ferent classroom situations.60 For example the study of historical movements like the Civil 
Rights Movement or the Indian Movement of Independence, where people have claimed 
the right to have rights and ultimately reached more inclusive communities of justice. 
Todd Jennings,61 amongst others suggests that human rights in education can ‘provide a 
framework to critique any contemporary standardization movement that might under-
mine the rights of children, teachers, or the communities in which they teach and learn’.62 
In other words, human rights in education can hence be seen as ‘part of a cosmopolitan, 
rather than globalization-oriented education, driven by ethical considerations in relation 
to internationalization trends’,63 rather than driven by economic imperatives. What the 
notion of human rights in education points to is the actual right to have rights, and espe-
cially the right to belong in a legal and political community.
56 Adami, “Counter Narratives”.
57 Joe Hoover, “Rereading the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Plurality and Contestation, Not Consensus,” 
Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013): 4-40.
58 Adami, “Reconciling Universality and Particularity”; Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots 
of the Universal Declaration, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
59 Rebecca Adami, “Re-Th inking Relations in Human Rights Education: Th e Politics of Narratives.” Journal of Philoso-
phy of Education in press (2014).
60 Cf. Rebecca Adami, “Towards Cosmopolitan Ethics in Teacher Education: An Ontological Dimension of Learning 
Human Rights,” Ethics and Education 9, no. 1 (2014): 29-38.
61 “Human Rights Education Standards for Teachers and Teacher Education.”
62 Ibid., 289.
63 Adami, “Towards Cosmopolitan Ethics,” 34.
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Concluding remarks
Challenges of globalization have become local concerns, such as solidarity in relation to 
migration and local responsibility for global environmental risks of human consumerist 
ignorance. Th ese challenges call education to grasp the intermediate between the national 
legislative and political constrains that need to be updated in a globalized world of interna-
tional dependence. Th ere is hence a need for re-conceptualizing and developing notions of 
ethical and moral aspects of education, where I have argued that paideia is a fruitful con-
ceptual path for such future explorations. Countering a neo liberal discourse on learning 
as an individualistic task of acquiring knowledge by a sovereign subject who is responsible 
for her/his own education, I reclaim a notion of learning in relations that encompasses the 
broader relations the social individual has with her/his social and political community and 
her/his active participation in it. 
Th e paper challenges Castoriadis claim that notions of education as the core of political 
philosophy died with the French Revolution, (his own work shows that it did not) by dra-
wing an argument with the help of Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero to rethink the 
political dimension of learning human rights as a way to enhance learners critical capacity 
for reimagining the laws in their community. 
I would like to think that this argument sets the earlier work made by Frank Margois, 
Gert Biesta and David T Hansen in relation to some of the global and at the same time 
local concerns that education is faced with today when politics concern broader notions 
of justice and equality. 
